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“ We should interrogate the architecture of cyberspace as we  
interrogate the code of Congress.”
– Lawrence Lessig
Introduction
The past three years have seen a small profusion of websites, perhaps as 
many as 80, spring up to capitalize on the high interest that mug shot pho-
tos generate online.1 Mug shots are public record, artifacts of an arrest, and 
these websites collect, organize, and optimize the photos so that they’re 
found more easily online. Proponents of such sites argue that the public has 
a right to know if their neighbor, romantic date, or colleague has an arrest 
record. Still, mug shots are not proof of conviction; they don’t signal guilt.
Having one online is likely to result in a reputational blemish; having that 
photo ranked as the first result when someone searches for your name on 
Google turns that blemish into a garish reputational wound, festering in 
facile accessibility. Some of these websites are exploiting this, charging peo-
ple to remove their photo from the site so that it doesn’t appear in online 
searches. It’s reputational blackmail. And remember, these people aren’t 
necessarily guilty of anything.
To crack down on the practice, states like Oregon, Georgia, and Utah have 
passed laws requiring these sites to take down the photos if the person’s 
record has been cleared. Some credit card companies have stopped pro-
cessing payments for the seediest of the sites. Clearly both legal and market 
forces can help curtail this activity, but there’s another way to deal with the 
issue too: algorithms. Indeed, Google recently launched updates to its rank-
Algorithmic Accountability Reporting: On the Investigation of Black Boxes
2
ing algorithm that down-weight results from mug shot websites, basically 
treating them more as spam than as legitimate information sources.2 With a 
single knock of the algorithmic gavel, Google declared such sites illegitimate.
At the turn of the millennium, 14 years ago, Lawrence Lessig taught us that 
“code is law”—that the architecture of systems, and the code and algorithms 
that run them, can be powerful influences on liberty.3 We’re living in a world 
now where algorithms adjudicate more and more consequential decisions 
in our lives. It’s not just search engines either; it’s everything from online 
review systems to educational evaluations, the operation of markets to how 
political campaigns are run, and even how social services like welfare and 
public safety are managed. Algorithms, driven by vast troves of data, are the 
new power brokers in society.
As the mug shots example suggests, algorithmic power isn’t necessarily det-
rimental to people; it can also act as a positive force. The intent here is not 
to demonize algorithms, but to recognize that they operate with biases like 
the rest of us.4 And they can make mistakes. What we generally lack as a 
public is clarity about how algorithms exercise their power over us. With 
that clarity comes an increased ability to publicly debate and dialogue the 
merits of any particular algorithmic power. While legal codes are available 
for us to read, algorithmic codes are more opaque, hidden behind layers 
of technical complexity. How can we characterize the power that various 
algorithms may exert on us? And how can we better understand when algo-
rithms might be wronging us? What should be the role of journalists in 
holding that power to account?
In the next section I discuss what algorithms are and how they encode power. 
I then describe the idea of algorithmic accountability, first examining how 
algorithms problematize and sometimes stand in tension with transpar-
ency. Next, I describe how reverse engineering can provide an alternative 
way to characterize algorithmic power by delineating a conceptual model 
that captures different investigative scenarios based on reverse engineering 
algorithms’ input-output relationships. I then provide a number of illus-
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trative cases and methodological details on how algorithmic accountability 
reporting might be realized in practice. I conclude with a discussion about 
broader issues of human resources, legality, ethics, and transparency.
Algorithmic Power
An algorithm can be defined as a series of steps undertaken in order to solve 
a particular problem or accomplish a defined outcome.5 Algorithms can be 
carried out by people, by nature, or by machines. The way you learned to do 
long division in grade school or the recipe you followed last night to cook 
dinner are examples of people executing algorithms. You might also say 
that biologically governed algorithms describe how cells transcribe DNA to 
RNA and then produce proteins—it’s an information transformation pro-
cess.6 While algorithms are everywhere around us, the focus of this paper 
are those algorithms that run on digital computers, since they have the most 
potential to scale and affect large swaths of people.
Autonomous decision-making is the crux of algorithmic power. Algo-
rithmic decisions can be based on rules about what should happen next 
in a process, given what’s already happened, or on calculations over mas-
sive amounts of data. The rules themselves can be articulated directly by 
programmers, or be dynamic and flexible based on the data. For instance, 
machine-learning algorithms enable other algorithms to make smarter 
decisions based on learned patterns in data. Sometimes, though, the out-
comes are important (or messy and uncertain) enough that a human opera-
tor makes the final decision in a process. But even in this case the algorithm 
is biasing the operator, by directing his or her attention to a subset of infor-
mation or recommended decision. Not all of these decisions are significant 
of course, but some of them certainly can be.
We can start to assess algorithmic power by thinking about the atomic deci-
sions that algorithms make, including prioritization, classification, associa-
tion, and filtering. Sometimes these decisions are chained in order to form 
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higher-level decisions and information transformations. For instance, some 
set of objects might be classified and then subsequently ranked based on 
their classifications. Or, certain associations to an object could help classify 
it: Two eyes and a nose associated with a circular blob might help you deter-
mine the blob is actually a face. Another composite decision is summariza-
tion, which uses prioritization and then filtering operations to consolidate 
information while maintaining the interpretability of that information. 
Understanding the elemental decisions that algorithms make, including the 
compositions of those decisions, can help identify why a particular algo-
rithm might warrant further investigation.
Prioritization
Prioritization, ranking, or ordering serves to emphasize or bring attention 
to certain things at the expense of others. The city of New York uses priori-
tization algorithms built atop reams of data to rank buildings for fire-code 
inspections, essentially optimizing for the limited time of inspectors and 
prioritizing the buildings most likely to have violations that need immedi-
ate remediation. Seventy percent of inspections now lead to eviction orders 
from unsafe dwellings, up from 13 percent without using the predictive 
algorithm—a clear improvement in helping inspectors focus on the most 
troubling cases.7
Prioritization algorithms can make all sorts of civil services more effi-
cient. For instance, predictive policing, the use of algorithms and analytics 
to optimize police attention and intervention strategies, has been shown 
to be an effective crime deterrent.8 Several states are now using data and 
ranking algorithms to identify how much supervision a parolee requires. 
In Michigan, such techniques have been credited with lowering the recidi-
vism rate by 10 percent since 2005.9 Another burgeoning application of data 
and algorithms ranks potential illegal immigrants so that higher risk indi-
viduals receive more scrutiny.10 Whether it’s deciding which neighborhood, 
parolee, or immigrant to prioritize, these algorithms are really about assign-
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ing risk and then orienting official attention aligned with that risk. When it 
comes to the question of justice though, we ought to ask: Is that risk being 
assigned fairly and with freedom from malice or discrimination?
Embedded in every algorithm that seeks to prioritize are criteria, or met-
rics, which are computed and used to define the ranking through a sorting 
procedure. These criteria essentially embed a set of choices and value-
propositions that determine what gets pushed to the top of the ranking. 
Unfortunately, sometimes these criteria are not public, making it difficult to 
understand the weight of different factors contributing to the ranking. For 
instance, since 2007 the New York City Department of Education has used 
what’s known as the value-added model (VAM) to rank about 15 percent 
of the teachers in the city. The model’s intent is to control for individual 
students’ previous performance or special education status and compute a 
score indicating a teacher’s contribution to students’ learning. When media 
organizations eventually obtained the rankings and scores through a Free-
dom of Information Law (FOIL) request, the teacher’s union argued that, 
“the reports are deeply flawed, subjective measurements that were intended 
to be confidential.”11 Analysis of the public data revealed that there was only 
a correlation of 24 percent between any given teacher’s scores across dif-
ferent pupils or classes. This suggests the output scores are very noisy and 
don’t precisely isolate the contribution of the teacher. What’s problematic in 
understanding why that’s the case is the lack of accessibility to the criteria 
that contributed to the fraught teacher rankings. What if the value-proposi-
tion of a certain criterion’s use or weighting is political or otherwise biased, 
intentionally or not?
Classification
Classification decisions involve categorizing a particular entity as a con-
stituent of a given class by looking at any number of that entity’s features. 
Classifications can be built off of a prioritization step by setting a threshold 
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(e.g., anyone with a GPA above X is classified as being on the honor roll), 
or through more sophisticated computing procedures involving machine 
learning or clustering.
Google’s Content ID is a good example of an algorithm that makes conse-
quential classification decisions that feed into filtering decisions12. Content 
ID is an algorithm that automatically scans all videos uploaded to YouTube, 
identifying and classifying them according to whether or not they have a 
bit of copyrighted music playing during the video. If the algorithm classi-
fies your video as an infringer it can automatically remove (i.e., filter) that 
video from the site, or it can initiate a dialogue with the content owner of 
that music to see if they want to enforce a copyright. Forget the idea of fair 
use, or a lawyer considering some nuanced and context-sensitive definition 
of infringement, the algorithm makes a cut-and-dry classification decision 
for you.
Classification algorithms can have biases and make mistakes though; 
there can be uncertainty in the algorithm’s decision to classify one way or 
another13. Depending on how the classification algorithm is implemented 
there may be different sources of error. For example, in a supervised 
machine-learning algorithm, training data is used to teach the algorithm 
how to place a dividing line to separate classes. Falling on either side of that 
dividing line determines to which class an entity belongs. That training data 
is often gathered from people who manually inspect thousands of examples 
and tag each instance according to its category. The algorithm learns how 
to classify based on the definitions and criteria humans used to produce the 
training data, potentially introducing human bias into the classifier.
In general, there are two kinds of mistakes a classification algorithm can 
make—often referred to as false positives and false negatives. Suppose 
Google is trying to classify a video into one of two categories: “infringing” 
or “fair use.” A false positive is a video classified as “infringing” when it is 
actually “fair use.” A false negative, on the other hand, is a video classified 
as “fair use” when it is in fact “infringing.” Classification algorithms can be 
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tuned to make fewer of either of those mistakes. However, as false positives 
are tuned down, false negatives will often increase, and vice versa. Tuned all 
the way toward false positives, the algorithm will mark a lot of fair use vid-
eos as infringing; tuned the other way it will miss a lot of infringing videos 
altogether. You get the sense that tuning one way or the other can privilege 
different stakeholders in a decision, implying an essential value judgment 
by the designer of such an algorithm14. The consequences or risks may vary 
for different stakeholders depending on the choice of how to balance false 
positive and false negative errors. To understand the power of classification 
algorithms we need to ask: Are there errors that may be acceptable to the 
algorithm creator, but do a disservice to the public? And if so, why was the 
algorithm tuned that way?
Association
Association decisions are about marking relationships between entities. 
A hyperlink is a very visible form of association between webpages. Algo-
rithms exist to automatically create hyperlinks between pages that share 
some relationship on Wikipedia for instance. A related algorithmic decision 
involves grouping entities into clusters, in a sort of association en masse. 
Associations can also be prioritized, leading to a composite decision known 
as relevance. A search engine prioritizes the association of a set of webpages 
in response to a query that a user enters, outputting a ranked list of relevant 
pages to view.
Association decisions draw their power through both semantics and con-
notative ability. Suppose you’re doing an investigation of doctors known to 
submit fraudulent insurance claims. Several doctors in your dataset have 
associations to known fraudsters (e.g., perhaps they worked together at 
some point in the past). This might suggest further scrutinizing those asso-
ciated doctors, even if there’s no additional evidence to suggest they have 
actually done something wrong.
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IBM sells a product called InfoSphere Identity Insight, which is used by 
various governmental social service management agencies to reduce fraud 
and help make decisions about resource allocation. The system is particu-
larly good at entity analytics, building up context around people (entities) 
and then figuring out how they’re associated. One of the IBM white papers 
for the product points out a use case that highlights the power of associa-
tive algorithms.15 The scenario depicted is one in which a potential foster 
parent, Johnson Smith, is being evaluated. InfoSphere is able to associate 
him, through a shared address and phone number, with his brother, a con-
victed felon. The paper then renders judgment: “Based on this investigation, 
approving Johnson Smith as a foster parent is not recommended.” In this 
scenario the social worker would deny a person the chance to be a foster 
parent because he or she has a felon in the family. Is that right? In this case 
because the algorithm made the decision to associate the two entities, that 
association suggested a particular decision for the social worker.
Association algorithms are also built on criteria that define the association. 
An important metric that gets fed into many of these algorithms is a simi-
larity function, which defines how precisely two things match according to 
the given association. When the similarity reaches a particular threshold 
value, the two things are said to have that association. Because of their rela-
tion to classification then, association decisions can also suffer the same 
kinds of false positive and false negative mistakes.
Filtering
The last algorithmic decision I’ll consider here is filtering, which involves 
including or excluding information according to various rules or criteria. 
Indeed, inputs to filtering algorithms often take prioritizing, classification, 
or association decisions into account. In news personalization apps like Zite 
or Flipboard news is filtered in and out according to how that news has 
been categorized, associated to the person’s interests, and prioritized for 
that person.
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Filtering decisions exert their power by either over-emphasizing or cen-
soring certain information. The thesis of Eli Pariser’s The Filter Bubble16 is 
largely predicated on the idea that by only exposing people to information 
that they already agree with (by overemphasizing it), it amplifies biases and 
hampers people’s development of diverse and healthy perspectives. Fur-
thermore, there’s the issue of censorship. Weibo, the Chinese equivalent 
to Twitter, uses computer systems that constantly scan, read, and censor 
any objectionable content before it’s published. If the algorithm isn’t sure, a 
human censor is notified to take a look.17
Algorithmic Accountability
In the previous section I tried to articulate some of the myriad ways that 
algorithms can exert power though decisions they make in prioritizing, 
classifying, associating, and filtering information. This inspires various 
questions we might use as a basis for beginning to investigate an algorithm:
 •  What is the basis for a prioritization decision? Is it fair and just, 
or discriminatory?
 •  What are the criteria built into a ranking, classification, or asso-
ciation, and are they politicized or biased in some consequential 
way? What are the limits to measuring and operationalizing the 
criteria used by the algorithm?
 •  What are the limits of an algorithm and when is it known to 
break down or fail? For instance: What types of errors are made 
in classification? How has the algorithm been tuned to privilege 
false positive or false negative errors? Does that tuning benefit 
one set of stakeholders over another? What are thresholds used 
in classification decisions? What kind of uncertainty is there in 
the classifier?
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 •  What are the potential biases of the training data used in a 
classifying algorithm? How has the algorithm evolved with that 
data? What types of parameters or data were used to initiate the 
algorithm?
 •  How are the semantics and similarity functions defined in an 
association algorithm? Do those definitions have implications for 
the interpretation or connotation of those associations?
 •  Are there some pieces of information that are differentially over-
emphasized or excluded by the algorithm? What are the editorial 
criteria of the algorithm and is such filtering warranted? What 
are the implications of that filtering?
From the list of questions above it should be clear that there are a number 
of human influences embedded into algorithms, such as criteria choices, 
training data, semantics, and interpretation. Any investigation must there-
fore consider algorithms as objects of human creation and take into account 
intent, including that of any group or institutional processes that may have 
influenced their design.
It’s with this concept in mind that I transition into devising a strategy to char-
acterize the power exerted by an algorithm. I’ll start first with an examina-
tion of transparency, and how it may or may not be useful in characterizing 
algorithms. Then I’ll move into how you might employ reverse engineering 
in the investigation of algorithms, including both theoretical thinking and 
practical use cases that illustrate the technique. I conclude the section with 
certain methodological details that might inform future practice in devel-
oping an investigative reporting “beat” on algorithms, including issues of 
how to identify algorithms for investigation, sample them, and find stories.
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Transparency
Transparency, as it relates to algorithmic power, is useful to consider as long 
as we are mindful of its bounds and limitations. The objective of any trans-
parency policy is to clearly disclose information related to a consequence or 
decision made by the public—so that whether voting, buying a product, or 
using a particular algorithm, people are making more informed decisions.18
Sometimes corporations and governments are voluntarily transparent. For 
instance, the executive memo from President Obama in 2009 launched his 
administration into a big transparency-in-government push. Google pub-
lishes a biannual transparency report showing how often it removes or 
discloses information to governments. Public relations concerns or com-
petitive dynamics can incentivize the release of information to the public. 
In other cases, the incentive isn’t there to self-disclose so the government 
sometimes intervenes with targeted transparency policies that compel 
disclosure. These often prompt the disclosure of missing information that 
might have bearing on public safety, the quality of services provided to the 
public, or issues of discrimination or corruption that might persist if the 
information weren’t available.
Transparency policies like restaurant inspection scores or automobile safety 
tests have been quite effective, while nutrition labeling, for instance, has had 
limited impact on issues of health or obesity. Moreover, when the govern-
ment compels transparency on itself, the results can be lacking. Consider 
the Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007,19 which requires 
the federal government to be transparent about everything from the goals 
of data mining, to the technology and data sources used, to the efficacy or 
likely efficacy of the data mining activity and an assessment on privacy and 
the civil liberties it impacts. The 2012 report from the Office of the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence (ODNI) reads, “ODNI did not engage in any 
activities to use or develop data mining functionality during the reporting 
period.”20 Meanwhile, Edward Snowden’s leaked documents reveal a differ-
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ent and conflicting story about data mining at the NSA. Even when laws 
exist compelling government transparency, the lack of enforcement is an 
issue. Watchdogging from third parties is as important as ever.
Oftentimes corporations limit how transparent they are, since exposing too 
many details of their proprietary systems (trade secrets) may undermine 
their competitive advantage, hurt their reputation and ability to do business, 
or leave the system open to gaming and manipulation. Trade secrets are a 
core impediment to understanding automated authority like algorithms 
since they, by definition, seek to hide information for competitive advan-
tage.21 Moreover, corporations are unlikely to be transparent about their sys-
tems if that information hurts their ability to sell a service or product, or 
otherwise tarnishes their reputation. And finally, gaming and manipulation 
are real issues that can undermine the efficacy of a system. Goodhart’s law, 
named after the banker Charles Goodhart who originated it, reminds us that 
once people come to know and focus on a particular metric it becomes inef-
fective: “When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.”22
In the case of government, the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
facilitates the public’s right to relevant government data and documents. 
While in theory FOIA also applies to source code for algorithms, investiga-
tors may run into the trade secret issue here as well. Exemption 4 to FOIA 
covers trade secrets and allows the federal government to deny requests for 
transparency concerning any third-party software integrated into its sys-
tems. Government systems may also be running legacy code from 10, 20, 
or 30-plus years ago. So even if you get the code, it might not be possible 
to reconstitute it without some ancient piece of enterprise hardware. That’s 
not to say, however, that more journalistic pressure to convince govern-
ments to open up about their code, algorithms, and systems isn’t warranted.
Another challenge to using transparency to elucidate algorithmic power is 
the cognitive overhead required when trying to explicate such potentially 
complex processes. Whereas data transparency can be achieved by publish-
ing a spreadsheet or database with an explanatory document of the scheme, 
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transparency of an algorithm can be much more complicated, resulting in 
additional labor costs both in the creation of that information as well as in 
its consumption. Methods for usable transparency need to be developed so 
that the relevant aspects of an algorithm can be presented in an understand-
able and plain-language way, perhaps with multiple levels of detail that inte-
grate into the decisions that end-users face as a result of that information.
When corporations or governments are not legally or otherwise incentiv-
ized to disclose information about their algorithms, we might consider a 
different, more adversarial approach.
Reverse Engineering: Theory
While transparency faces a number of challenges as an effective check on 
algorithmic power, an alternative and complementary approach is emerg-
ing based around the idea of reverse engineering how algorithms are built. 
Reverse engineering is the process of articulating the specifications of a 
system through a rigorous examination drawing on domain knowledge, 
observation, and deduction to unearth a model of how that system works. 
It’s “the process of extracting the knowledge or design blueprints from any-
thing man-made.”23
Some algorithmic power may be exerted intentionally, while other aspects 
might be incidental. The inadvertent variety will benefit from reverse engi-
neering’s ability to help characterize unintended side effects. Because the 
process focuses on the system’s performance in-use it can tease out con-
sequences that might not be apparent even if you spoke directly to the 
designers of the algorithm. On the other hand, talking to a system’s design-
ers can also uncover useful information: design decisions, descriptions of 
the objectives, constraints, and business rules embedded in the system, 
major changes that have happened over time, as well as implementation 
details that might be relevant.24,25 For this reason, I would advocate that 
journalists engage in algorithmic accountability not just through reverse 
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engineering but also by using reporting techniques, such as interviews or 
document reviews, and digging deep into the motives and design intentions 
behind algorithms.
Algorithms are often described as black boxes, their complexity and techni-
cal opacity hiding and obfuscating their inner workings. At the same time, 
algorithms must always have an input and output; the black box actually 
has two little openings. We can take advantage of those inputs and outputs 
to reverse engineer what’s going on inside. If you vary the inputs in enough 
ways and pay close attention to the outputs, you can start piecing together 
a theory, or at least a story, of how the algorithm works, including how it 
transforms each input into an output, and what kinds of inputs it’s using. 
We don’t necessarily need to understand the code of the algorithm to start 
surmising something about how the algorithm works in practice.
Inputs Outputs
Inputs Outputs
(A) I/O Relationship Fully Observable




(A) I/O Rel tionship Fully Observable
(B) Only Output Observable
Figure 1. Two black box scenarios with varying levels of observability.
Figure 1 depicts two different black-box scenarios of interest to journalists 
reverse engineering algorithms by looking at the input-output relationship. 
The first scenario, in Figure 1(A), corresponds to an ability to fully observe 
all of an algorithm’s inputs and outputs. This is the case for algorithms 
accessible via an online API, which facilitates sending different inputs to the 
algorithm and directly recording the output.
Figure 1(B) depicts a scenario in which only the outputs of the algorithm are 
visible. The value-added model used in educational rankings of teachers is 
an example of this case. The teacher rankings themselves became available 
Columbia Journalism School | TOW CENTER FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM
 15
via a FOIA request, but the inputs to the algorithm used to rank teachers 
were still not observable. This is the most common case that data journalists 
encounter: A large dataset is available but there is limited (or no) informa-
tion about how that data was transformed algorithmically. Interviews and 
document investigation are especially important here in order to understand 
what was fed into the algorithm, in terms of data, parameters, and ways in 
which the algorithm is used. It could be an interesting test of existing FOIA 
laws to examine the extent to which unobservable algorithmic inputs can be 
made visible through document or data requests for transparency.
Sometimes inputs can be partially observable but not controllable; for 
instance, when an algorithm is being driven off public data but it’s not clear 
exactly what aspect of that data serves as inputs into the algorithm. In gen-
eral, the observability of the inputs and outputs is a limitation and challenge 
to the use of reverse engineering in practice. There are many algorithms 
that are not public facing, used behind an organizational barrier that makes 
them difficult to prod. In such cases, partial observability (e.g., of outputs) 
through FOIA, Web-scraping, or something like crowdsourcing can still 
lead to some interesting results.
Reverse Engineering: Practice
In this subsection I detail five case studies of journalists using a reverse-engi-
neering approach to understand algorithms. I’ll draw on my experience ana-
lyzing censorship and defamation in search-engine autosuggest algorithms, 
as well as conversations I had with Michael Keller (The Daily Beast), Scott 
Klein (ProPublica), Jeremy Singer-Vine (Wall Street Journal), and Rob Barry 
(Wall Street Journal), all of whom have had direct experience working on or 
editing algorithmic accountability stories. The goal is to provide a summary 
of these efforts, to connect them to the theoretical component above, and to 
note the challenges encountered in employing the method in practice.
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Autocompletions on Google and Bing
The Google autocomplete FAQ reads, “We exclude a narrow class of search 
queries related to pornography, violence, hate speech, and copyright 
infringement.” Bing, on the other hand, makes sure to “filter spam” as well as 
to “detect adult or offensive content.” Such editorial choices set the stage for 
broadly specifying the types of things that get censored. But what exactly 
are the boundaries of that censorship, and how do they differ among search 
engines? More importantly, what kinds of mistakes do these algorithms 
make in applying their editorial criteria?
To answer these questions, I automatically gathered autosuggest results 
from hundreds of queries related to sex and violence in an effort to find 
those that were surprising or deviant.26 Using a list of 110 sex-related key-
words drawn from academic and slang sources as inputs to the algorithm, 
I looked to see which inputs resulted in zero output—suggesting a blocked 
word. While many of the most obvious words were outright blocked—like 
“ass” and “tits”—a number of the search terms were not. The lack of block-
age becomes more significant when adding the prefix “child” to the query, 
since some of the suggestions lead to child pornography, which is illegal and 
ought to be blocked.
This case illustrates an ideal situation for the use of algorithmic-accountabil-
ity reporting. Some transparency by the services through their FAQ’s and 
blogs suggest a hypothesis and tip as to what types of input the algorithm 
might be sensitive to (i.e., pornography and violence-related words). More-
over, the algorithms themselves, both their inputs and outputs, are observ-
able and accessible through APIs, which make it relatively easy to quickly 
collect a wide range of observations about the input-output relationship.
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Autocorrections on the iPhone
Another example of surfacing editorial criteria in algorithms comes from 
Michael Keller, now at Al Jazeera, but who at the time was working at The 
Daily Beast.27 He dove into the iPhone spelling correction feature to see 
which words, like “abortion” or “rape,” the phone wouldn’t correct if they 
were typed incorrectly.
Michael’s first attempt to sample this phenomenon was an API on the 
iPhone, which he used to identify words from a large dictionary that weren’t 
getting corrected, essentially pruning down the space of inputs to see what 
the algorithm “paid attention” to. Eventually he noticed that some of the 
words the API did not correct were getting corrected when they were typed 
directly on an iPhone. There was a mismatch between what the API was 
reporting and what the user was experiencing. In order to mimic the real 
user experience he had to run an iPhone simulator on a number of comput-
ers, scripting it to act like a human typing in the word and then clicking the 
word to see if spelling corrections were presented.
This example raises an important caveat. Sometimes algorithms expose 
inputs and make it possible to record outputs, but those outputs are then 
further transformed and edited before they get to the user interface. What 
really matters in the end is not just the output of the algorithm, but how 
that output is made available to the user. While this case is again an instance 
of full observability, it reminds us that we need to consider the output in 
context in order to understand and report on the algorithm’s consequences.
Targeting Political Emails
During the 2012 presidential campaign, Dan Sinker, head of the Knight-
Mozilla OpenNews project, noticed that the Obama campaign was sending 
slight variations of the same email to different people. ProPublica picked up 
the tip and started gathering hundreds and then thousands of these targeted 
Algorithmic Accountability Reporting: On the Investigation of Black Boxes
18
emails, soliciting them from people who were willing to forward them on to 
the news organization. Reporters had heard the Obama team was running 
a sophisticated data operation but no one inside the campaign was talking.
The Message Machine,28 as it came to be called, tried to reverse engineer 
how the campaign was using targeting information to adapt and personalize 
email messages for different recipients. In addition to collecting the emails, 
ProPublica solicited the recipients to fill out a survey asking about basic 
demographic information, where they lived, and if they had donated or vol-
unteered for the campaign before. These survey answers then served as the 
input to the algorithm they were trying to dissect. In this case, the output 
was observable—crowdsourced from thousands of people—but the types 
of inputs used by the targeting algorithm were hidden behind the campaign 
wall and thus not controllable by journalists. Instead, ProPublica was tasked 
with determining, based on the outputs collected and a proxy for the inputs 
(collected with the survey), what types of inputs the campaign’s targeting 
algorithm was actually paying attention to.
In one instance the analysis was wrong, as Scott Klein, an editor who worked 
on Message Machine, explained to me. “We slipped and we said that ‘in 
such and such an example they are targeting by age.’” After the campaign 
was over, however, Klein and his colleagues found that in fact the campaign 
was not targeting by age, but by another correlated variable: donation his-
tory. The lesson here for reverse engineering is that we need to be careful 
when using correlations to make claims about what inputs an algorithm 
is actually using. When we don’t have access to the algorithm’s inputs we 
can only make statistically informed guesses. Correlation does not imply 
causation, nor intent on the part of the designer. As much as algorithmic 
accountability can help us diagnose the existence of a problem, we have to 
go deeper and do reporting (when possible) to understand the motivations 
or intentions behind an algorithm. Ultimately, we still need to answer the 
question of “why?”
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Price Discrimination in Online Commerce
In 2013, the Wall Street Journal began probing e-commerce platforms to 
identify instances of potential price discrimination—the provision of dif-
ferent prices to different people.29 By polling different websites it was able 
to spot several vendors, such as Staples, Home Depot, Rosetta Stone, and 
Orbitz, that were adjusting prices dynamically based on different factors 
like user geography, browser history, or mobile-browser use. In the case of 
Staples, it found that the input most strongly correlated to price was the 
distance to a rival’s store, explaining about 90 percent of the pricing pattern.
To get the story the WSJ had to simulate visiting the various sites from 
different computers and browsers in different geographies.30 This initially 
required using various proxy servers that made it appear like the website 
was being loaded from different geographies. The publication’s staff also 
created different archetype users and built user profiles using cookies to see 
how those user profiles might impact the prices recorded. This case again 
mimics Figure 1(A), wherein both inputs and outputs are fully observable. 
Yet, it was more complex than that of the autocomplete algorithm since a 
straightforward API wasn’t available. Instead, the journalists had to pains-
takingly reconstruct profiles that simulated inputs to the algorithm, and 
look to see if any of the variables in those profiles led to significant differ-
ences in output (prices).
Using reverse engineering on the scale of the Web surfaces several chal-
lenges, underscored both by the WSJ story and by academic efforts to 
reverse engineer personalization in Web search.31 One of the issues is that 
sites like Staples might be using A/B testing to analyze whether or not sub-
tle differences on their websites are useful to them. In other words, they’re 
already running experiments on their sites, and to a reverse engineer it 
might look like noise, or just confusing irregularities. Algorithms may 
be unstable and change over time, or have randomness built in to them, 
which makes understanding patterns in their input-output relationship 
much more challenging. If you suspect the algorithm may be extremely 
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dynamic and time-sensitive you may need to initiate all of your inputs to 
the algorithm in parallel in order to minimize the impact of a changing and 
dynamic algorithm.
Executive Stock Trading Plans
Executives and corporate leaders sometimes use preset trading plans to 
avoid accusations of insider trading. The algorithmic plans can get triggered 
by any number of different parameters, like specific dates, stock prices, or 
announcements from competitors. The only catch is that the plans can’t be 
based on inside information. When an executive makes a trade, he or she 
files a form with the SEC. The Wall Street Journal collected millions of these 
forms in an attempt to use reverse engineering to see if any of the plans were 
“opportunistic”—if they appeared to be taking advantage of market timing 
to increase profits.32
In this case, the output was observable since the prices of all trades were 
known. What the WSJ was interested in was reverse engineering how tim-
ing information was being used by different plans as an input. Timing was 
observable, placing this scenario in Figure 1(A) where both inputs and out-
puts are known. Essentially the WSJ had a sampled input-output relation-
ship for each executive’s plan specified by the documents filed with the SEC. 
However, what it didn’t know was any of the other inputs that could have 
also been feeding into these plans. Even though trade forms must be filed, 
the details of the plans themselves are hidden, leaving the reverse engineer 
to guess what inputs the algorithm was likely using. Perhaps competitor 
or sector prices are also inputs to some plans, requiring consideration of 
each variable in turn to assess whether there were correlations suggesting a 
connection. This case underscores the challenge with trying to understand 
which inputs an algorithm pays attention to. There is a huge space of poten-
tial inputs, some of which are observable and some of which are not. Practi-
cally speaking you have to choose which inputs you want to investigate to 
see if they are relevant to the algorithm.
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Toward a Methodology
Given the cases presented in the last section, as well as other examples of 
reverse engineering algorithms published in academic or non-mainstream 
outlets,33,34,35,36,37 there are several key challenges to launching an investiga-
tion into an algorithm: identifying a meaningful target, sampling the algo-
rithm, and finding the story.
Identification
In looking for algorithms that we want to hold accountable, we might ask 
several questions: What are the consequences and impact of that algorithm 
for the public, how significant are those consequences, and how many peo-
ple might be affected by or perceive an effect by the algorithm? We might 
ask whether the algorithm has the potential for discrimination, or whether 
errors made by the algorithm may create risks that negatively impact the 
public. When a classification decision has negative consequences, then 
looking for false positives, like Content ID’s identifying fair-use content as 
infringing, can be a tip indicating a deeper story. We might also wonder 
about censorship: How might the algorithm steer public attention and filter 
information in meaningful patterns?
Essentially what we’re looking to identify is an algorithm that’s made a bad 
decision, that somehow breaks an expectation for how we think it ought to be 
operating. Is the algorithm’s output consistent with what we think it should 
be? And if not, what’s driving that inconsistency—a bug, an incidental pro-
gramming decision, or a deep seated design intent? Observations, tips, and 
digging through data are all ways that we can identify interesting and signifi-
cant algorithmic decisions that might warrant accountability reporting.
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Sampling
After choosing an algorithm on which to focus, the challenge then becomes 
how to sample the input-output relationship of the algorithm in some 
meaningful way. As indicated in the last section, there are many scenarios 
with varying degrees of observability as related to algorithmic inputs and 
outputs. Sometimes everything is out in the open and there are APIs that 
can be sampled, whereas other times inputs are obfuscated. Figuring out 
how to observe or simulate those inputs is a key part of a practical investi-
gation involving reverse engineering. Reporting techniques and talking to 
sources are two ways to try to understand what inputs are being fed into an 
algorithm, but when trade secrets obscure the process we’re often reduced 
to guessing (e.g., “Targeting Political Emails” and “Executive Stock Trad-
ing Plans”). Figuring out what the algorithm pays attention to input-wise 
becomes as intriguing a question as how the algorithm transforms input 
into output.
Given a potentially infinite sampling space, we must define what is interest-
ing and important for us to feed into an algorithm. For my story on search-
engine autocompletions I wanted to know which sex-related words were 
blocked by Google and Bing, as well as whether adding “child” to the query 
led to any difference in output; were child sex-related queries leading to 
child pornography as well? The sampling strategy followed from these ques-
tions. I constructed a list of 110 sex-related words drawn from both aca-
demic linguists and Urban Dictionary slang to act as the basis for queries. 
Of course there are many other words and permutations of query templates 
that I might have used—the richness of language and diversity of expression 
mean that it will always be hard to come up with the “right” queries when 
working with algorithms that deal in human language.
Similarly, for Jeremy Singer-Vine working on the price discrimination story 
at the WSJ, an initial hurdle for the project was getting a representative sam-
ple from enough different and dispersed geographies. There are proxy serv-
ers that you can rent in different zip codes to do this, but they’re not available 
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in every area, nor are they often in the same zip codes as residential neigh-
borhoods. Deciding how to sample the input-output relationship of an algo-
rithm is the first key challenge, and a difficult dance between what you can 
sample and what you would like to sample in order to answer your question.
Of course it’s not just about getting any valid sample either. You also have 
to make sure that the sample simulates the reality of importance to your 
audience. This was a key difficulty for Michael Keller’s project on iPhone 
autocorrections, which eventually demanded he simulate the iPhone with 
scripts that mimic how a human uses the phone. I had a similar experi-
ence using an API to do my analysis of Google and Bing autocompletions—
the API results don’t perfectly line up with what the user experiences. For 
instance, the Google API returns 20 results, but only shows four or 10 in 
the user interface (UI) depending on how preferences are set. The Bing API 
returns 12 results but only shows eight in the UI. Data returned from the 
API that never appears in the UI is less significant since users will never 
encounter it in their daily usage—so I didn’t report on it even though I had 
it collected.
In some cases, someone else has already done the sampling of an algorithm 
and left you with a large dataset that might represent some input-output 
relationship. Or you may not have any control of inputs because those 
inputs are actually individual people you’re unable or not ethically willing 
to simulate, such as in ProPublica’s Message Machine. Though observation 
of such data can still be useful, I would argue that an experimental method-
ology is more powerful as it allows you to directly sample the input-output 
relationship in ways that let you assess particular questions you may have 
about how the algorithm is functioning. Indeed, there is a strong connec-
tion between the reverse engineering I’m espousing here and the scientific 
method. Some computer scientists have even called computing “the fourth 
great scientific domain” (after physical, biological, and social domains) due 
to the sheer complexity of the artificial computing systems humankind has 
built, so big that their understanding demands study in the same ways as 
other natural disciplines.38
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Finding the story
Once you’ve got the input-output relationship of your black box mapped 
out, the next step is to search and filter for newsworthy insights. In some 
sense this goes back to expectations that define whether the algorithm is 
missing the mark somehow, or is exhibiting some behavior that has implica-
tions for the audience. These expectations could be statistically based, built 
on an understanding of social and legal norms, or defined by comparing 
similar vendors of the technology like Google and Bing autocompletions, 
or iPhone and Android autocorrections. It can be useful to look at the false 
positives and false negatives for ideas about how and where the algorithm 
is failing.
At the WSJ the first filter used for narrowing-in on e-commerce sites was a 
statistical one: the variance of prices returned from a site for a given item 
across a variety of geographies. If any non-random variance was observed, 
the site was marked for a more rigorous and in-depth analysis. Similarly, 
Rob Barry, who worked on the executive trading plans story for the WSJ, 
described to me a sophisticated data-mining technique involving clustering 
and Monte Carlo simulation to find newsworthy cases by trying to identify 
trading plans that fell outside of the norms of expectation.
In my own projects I have used social and legal norms to help zero-in on 
stories inside the collected data.39 In the case of the autocomplete algo-
rithms, both Google and Bing had publicly expressed a desire to filter 
suggestions relating to pornography. Taking that a step further, child por-
nography is indeed a violation of the legal code, so searching for instances of 
that became a starting point for filtering the data I had collected. Knowing 
where the algorithm violates the designers’ expectations (e.g., it lets through 
child pornography when the stated intent is not to do so), or where it may 
have unintended side effects can both make for interesting stories.
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Another editorial criterion that Google uses in its autocomplete results 
relates to blocking violence. As part of my analysis I also queried the algo-
rithm using 348 words from the Random House “violent actions” list to see 
whether Google was steering users toward knowledge of how to act violently. 
Since violence becomes a more interesting story if it’s being suggested toward 
other people or living things I filtered my results against man-, woman-, per-
son-, and animal-related word lists, essentially creating a newsworthiness 
filter. This sped up my ability to go through the results. Rather than reading 
through 14,000 results, I was reviewing fewer than 1,000.
Still, even with newsworthiness filters helping to identify possible stories, 
it’s absolutely essential to have reporters in the loop digging deeper. For 
every site that was flagged as a statistical hit, Singer-Vine’s team did a much 
more comprehensive analysis, writing custom code to analyze each. “There’s 
an incredible role for traditional reporting to play in a story like that,” said 
Singer-Vine. Knowing what makes something a story is perhaps less about 
a filter for statistical, social, or legal deviance than it is about understanding 
the context of the phenomenon, including historical, cultural, and social 
expectations related to the issue—all things with which traditional report-
ing and investigation can help. Sure it can be hard to get the companies 
running these algorithms to open up in detail about how their algorithms 
work, but reaching out for interviews can still be valuable. Even a trickle of 
information about the larger goals and objectives of the algorithms can help 
you better situate your reverse-engineering analysis. Understanding intent 
and motives is an important piece of the puzzle. In covering the redistrict-
ing story last year, Scott Klein, the news applications editor at ProPublica, 
considered using some computational means to detect gerrymandering, but 
quickly decided that, “it [gerrymandering] is a motive, not a shape,” which 
ultimately made traditional reporting techniques much more effective for 
investigating the story.
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Discussion
Looking forward, we’re faced with a number of challenges to actualizing 
algorithmic accountability in practice. Here I briefly touch on some of those 
challenges, including issues of human resources, legality, ethics, and the 
role that transparency might still effectively play.
Developing the human resource to do algorithmic-accountability reporting 
will take dedicated efforts to teach the computational thinking, program-
ming, and technical skills needed to make sense of algorithmic decisions. 
While there is growing awareness of more complex algorithms among data 
journalists, the number of computational journalists with the technical 
skills to do a deep investigation of algorithms is still rather limited. Team-
ing computationally literate reporters with tech-savvy computer scientists 
might be one method for doing more algorithmic accountability reporting. 
Another way would be to train journalists themselves in more computa-
tional techniques. Either way, we probably need more experience with the 
method before we can effectively teach it. “There’s no conventional or obvi-
ous approach to it. It’s a lot of testing or trial and error, and it’s hard to teach 
in any uniform way,” noted Jeremy Singer-Vine. I also spoke to Chase Davis, 
an assistant editor at The New York Times and instructor at the Missouri 
School of Journalism, who concurred: “Teaching it explicitly at this point 
might be difficult…a beat would be a stretch because there’s no single uni-
fying theme to it. It crosses a lot of boundaries in a way that standard data-
driven journalism or CAR does.”
Legally speaking, the reverse engineering of commercial software does have 
some pitfalls. Other than the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 
there are no laws that directly prohibit or restrict reverse engineering, and 
even the DMCA has exemptions.40 Software vendors do typically add anti-
reverse engineering clauses to End User License Agreements (EULAs),41 
forcing the decision: Is it okay to breach such a contract if it gets you closer 
to the truth about the algorithm? Helen Nissenbaum, a professor at New 
York University, has suggested that laws might be in order to stipulate lim-
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its on Terms of Service to allow more room for individuals to negotiate 
their relationship with online entities.42 Perhaps more problematic is a law 
like the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). 43 Peter Ludlow recounts 
the story of Andrew Auernheimer, who wrote a script to collect private 
customer information that was inadvertently available on a public AT&T 
site.44 Auernheimer was prosecuted under the CFAA and sentenced to 41 
months in prison. Tread carefully here and seek qualified legal advice before 
attempting to reverse engineer algorithms or collect data from corporate or 
government entities.
Besides the legality of reverse engineering corporate or government sys-
tems, there are other ethical questions that arise in the context of study-
ing algorithms. In particular we need to ask ourselves about the possible 
ramifications or negative consequences of publishing details of how cer-
tain algorithms work. Would publishing such information negatively affect 
any individuals? More importantly, perhaps, is the issue of gaming brought 
up in the earlier section on transparency. Goodhart’s law states, again, that 
once people know about a measure it’s no longer a good one since they’ll 
start trying to manipulate it. By publishing details of how an algorithm 
functions, specifically information about what inputs it pays attention to, 
how it uses various criteria in a ranking, or what criteria it uses to censor, 
how might that allow the algorithm to be manipulated or circumvented? 
And who stands to benefit from that manipulation? If publishing reverse-
engineering information on how Google-search ranking works helps SEO 
black-hats get more spam information into our search results, then what 
did we really accomplish? The ethical principal of beneficence offers guid-
ance here: Try to maximize anticipated benefits while minimizing possible 
risks of harm to the public.
It may still be too early to develop standards on how entities creating and 
running algorithms might be more transparent about their technical sys-
tems, while respecting their right to trade secrets and their desire to mitigate 
gaming. Ultimately, we need to find a workable balancing point between 
trade secrets and transparency. Well-trodden transparency policies in other 
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domains do offer some opportunity to reflect on how such policy might be 
adapted for algorithms.45 For instance, targeted transparency policies always 
indicate the boundaries of disclosure, a contentious point as that boundary 
will dictate the limits of trade secret, and the degree of time and money 
invested by the algorithm creator in publishing the required transparency 
information. A policy would also need to indicate what factors or metrics 
of the algorithm would be disclosed, the frequency of their disclosure (e.g., 
daily, monthly, or real-time), and the vehicle for communicating that infor-
mation (e.g., a separate document, or integrated into the algorithmic output 
in some way).
The challenge to standardizing what should be disclosed about algorithms 
may come down to building consensus about what factors or metrics are 
both significant and acceptable. Frequency of disclosure, as well as com-
munication vehicle, are important for adoption, but before we get there we 
need to know the informational content that might be disclosed. The ques-
tions at the beginning of the “Algorithmic Accountability” section form the 
basis for aspects of algorithms that we might consider here. This includes 
things like (1) the criteria used to prioritize, rank, emphasize, or editorialize 
things in the algorithm, including their definitions, operationalizations, and 
possibly even alternatives; (2) what data act as inputs to the algorithm—
what it “pays attention” to, and what other parameters are used to initiate 
the algorithm; (3) the false positive and false negative rate of errors made 
in classification, including the rationale for how the balance point is set 
between those errors; (4) training data and its potential bias, including the 
evolution and dynamics of the algorithm as it learns from data; and (5) the 
definitions, operationalizations, or thresholds used by similarity or classi-
fication algorithms. To achieve a comprehensive public audit of an algo-
rithm, we need to reach a consensus about which of these factors might be 
appropriate to make public, or semi-public (e.g., to an escrow third-party 
auditor). The hope is that as we develop more experience doing algorithmic 
accountability reporting the factors that are most significant to embed in a 
standardized algorithmic transparency policy will come into clearer focus.
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In the case of algorithms, where complexity reigns, and the computational 
literacy of the public may be limited, the role of professional and more 
sophisticated interpreters of transparency information will be essential. 
In the same way that business journalists contextualize and help the pub-
lic understand the information produced through financial transparency 
of companies, journalists will also be needed to frame, contextualize, and 
explain the transparency information about algorithms.
It’s worth noting that as news organizations also come to employ algo-
rithms in the shaping of the news they report, whether that be in finding 
new stories in massive datasets or presenting stories interactively, some 
of the same issues with transparency arise—news organizations are, after 
all, corporations that may have trade secrets to keep or systems to buttress 
from manipulation. But with the recent shift toward transparency as a core 
ideal of the journalistic enterprise,46 tensions emerge between the ideal of 
transparency and the reality of algorithms. Chase Davis noted that one of 
the main challenges to building newsroom algorithms is providing a win-
dow for the reporter into how a particular algorithmic decision was made. 
It remains to be seen how news organizations will incorporate the evidence 
that algorithms or simulations provide with an epistemology and ethic that 
demands full transparency. Perhaps the public editor of the future will also 
play the role of algorithmic ombudsman.
Summary and Moving Forward
We’re now operating in a world where automated algorithms make impact-
ful decisions that can and do amplify the power of business and govern-
ment. I’ve argued in this paper that we need to do better in deciphering the 
contours of that power. As algorithms come to regulate society and perhaps 
even implement law directly,47 we should proceed with caution and think 
carefully about how we choose to regulate them back.48 Journalists might 
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productively offer themselves as a check and balance on algorithmic power 
while the legislative regulation of algorithms takes shape over a longer 
time horizon.
In this paper I’ve offered a basis for understanding algorithmic power in 
terms of the types of decisions algorithms make in prioritizing, classifying, 
associating, and filtering information. Understanding those wellsprings of 
algorithmic power suggests a number of diagnostic questions that further 
inform a more critical stance toward algorithms. Given the challenges to 
effectively employing transparency for algorithms, namely trade secrets, the 
consequences of manipulation, and the cognitive overhead of complexity, I 
propose that journalists might effectively engage with algorithms through 
a process of reverse engineering. By understanding the input-output rela-
tionships of an algorithm we can start to develop stories about how that 
algorithm operates.
Sure, there are challenges here too: legal, ethical, and technical, but reverse 
engineering is another tactic for the tool belt—a technique that has already 
shown it can be useful at times. Next time you hear about software or an 
algorithm being used to help make a decision, you might get critical and 
start asking questions about how that software could be affecting outcomes. 
Try to FOIA it, try to understand whether you can reverse engineer it, and 
when you’re finished, write up your method for how you got there. By 
method-sharing we’ll expand our ability to replicate these types of stories, 
and, over time, perhaps even develop enough expertise to suggest standards 
for algorithmic transparency that acknowledge business concerns while still 
surfacing useful information for the public.
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